PEPSP-1 · Public assessment
ERPI Global Disorder Index
Tracking systemic pressure across the international operating environment.
Assessment date:
PEPSP-1 public synthesis
Assessment
The public GDI rises to 9.6 as geopolitical disruption transmits more strongly into the cost of maintaining essential flows. Energy, food, transport and financing remain connected channels of strain. Recovering shipments, diplomatic mediation and coordinated policy responses provide material counterpressure, but their reach and durability remain uneven. The condition remains Systemic transmission phase, with the direction rising.
Focus or point to a marker for its approved reading.
View the approved GDI data table
| Assessment | GDI | Release note |
|---|---|---|
| Opening Jan 2025 | 4.5 | Opening of the approved public trendline |
| September 2025 | 7.75 | Approved September public reading |
| End 2025 | 8.6 | Approved end-2025 trajectory |
| 20 March 2026 | 9.1 | Publication-approved March reading |
| 3 April 2026 | 9.2 | Publication-approved April reading |
| 25 August 2026 | 9.4 | Publication-approved August reading |
| 10 September 2026 | 9.5 | Publication-approved September reading |
| 4 October 2026 | 9.6 | Current publication-approved reading |
Approved component readings
Public assessment components
PEPSP-1 public analysis
The rising cost of continuity
The public Global Disorder Index stands at 9.6 on 4 October 2026, compared with 9.5 on 10 September. Climate disruption is assessed at 9.7, geopolitical volatility at 9.9, economic stress at 9.6, and technology and governance strain at 8.9. The public condition remains Systemic transmission phase, with the direction rising. The 0.1-point increase expresses ERPI’s assessment of further systemic pressure. It is not a probability, a percentage change in global risk or a claim that all regions are moving together.
The defining development is the rising cost of continuity. Disruption in one system increasingly changes the resources required to keep others operating: fuel affects transport, transport affects food access, and both influence the budgets available for services and recovery. The October assessment places greater weight on this transmission than on the arrival of a wholly new category of shock. Essential flows continue, but maintaining them can require more rerouting, substitution, financing and institutional effort. These are analytical connections; their strength varies across countries, sectors and communities.
Energy illustrates both the pressure and the capacity to respond. In their 2 October statement, G7 leaders announced an IEA-coordinated release of 100 million barrels over four months, including a substantial early diesel release. The statement links this action to implementation of the March commitments. It also provides for refinery coordination and reaffirms a commitment against energy-export restrictions within the group. These measures demonstrate an available policy response. They do not establish that the full volume has already reached markets or that prices and access have normalised.
Shipping presents a similarly mixed picture. Reuters reported on 2 October that September LNG shipments through the Strait of Hormuz reached their highest monthly level since the war began, drawing on commercial tracking providers whose cargo totals differ. That improvement is meaningful counterevidence to an account of uninterrupted deterioration. It does not demonstrate restored normal passage: the report describes continuing security uncertainty and incomplete tracking where vessels switch off their transponders. The relevant strategic distinction is between a flow that has resumed and a flow that can be maintained reliably and affordably.
Food provides a clearer new observation of economic transmission. FAO’s 2 October release records a September Food Price Index of 136.0, up 1.5% from August and 5.8% from a year earlier; cereal prices increased by 5.1% in the month. FAO identifies transport disruption and weather pressures among the drivers. Its global cereal-production forecast nevertheless remains the second largest on record. The evidence supports concern about access, logistics and affordability alongside substantial aggregate supply. International commodity quotations must not be read as proof that every country’s consumer food prices have already risen by the same amount.
Ukraine provides a further infrastructure transmission pathway. Associated Press reporting on 1 October describes attacks affecting energy, railways, communications and other civilian economic infrastructure. Reuters reported on 4 October that President Volodymyr Zelenskiy had said Ukraine would intensify attacks on Russian refineries, while German officials described planned military and energy-repair assistance during Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s visit to Kyiv. The announced actions and attributed intentions remain distinct from verified outcomes. The assessment concerns the exposure of essential networks and the resources needed to repair them; planned assistance is counterpressure, not proof that damaged capacity has been restored.
Climate disruption remains at 9.7. WMO’s 23 September warning describes a strengthening El Niño and heightened health risks associated with heat, flooding and drought, with a very strong event forecast by the end of the year. These warnings reinforce the pressure already incorporated into the September assessment. They also highlight uneven regional exposure, including the approach of the Southern Hemisphere’s hottest season. Holding the component recognises continuity in an already severe condition; a renewed forecast is not automatically evidence of an additional realised deterioration of the same scale.
Technology and governance strain remains at 8.9. ENISA’s 2026 Threat Landscape reports that 73% of targeted organisations in its recorded incidents were essential or important entities under the NIS2 definition. Its incident period is January–December 2025. This evidence reinforces concern about digital dependencies and critical services, but its EU scope and retrospective coverage do not establish a new global deterioration since 10 September. The October assessment therefore retains the existing component reading rather than treating the publication date as the date of the underlying events.
The counterevidence remains material. Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated on 29 September that mediation between the United States and Iran continued, with support for Pakistan’s role. Improved LNG movements and the announced energy measures also show that diplomatic, logistical and institutional responses remain available. A competing interpretation is that part of the deterioration reflects severe but reversible congestion rather than a further lasting loss of capacity. That interpretation would gain weight if safer passage, affordable supply and delivered assistance persisted. The existence of a channel or commitment alone cannot establish its eventual result.
Economic stress consequently rises from 9.4 to 9.6, while geopolitical volatility rises from 9.8 to 9.9. These are the component judgments retained for this assessment, not a calculation from the cited commodity figures. The financial transmission is an analytical concern: higher input and transport costs can reduce purchasing capacity, increase working-capital needs and narrow the resources available for recovery. This publication does not claim a newly measured global acceleration in borrowing costs or consumer inflation. The burden depends on import dependence, exchange rates, fiscal space and access to substitutes.
Within ERPI’s 3°C World Strategic Risk Policy® approach, the strategic test is whether continuity can be sustained while response capacity is replenished. A reserve release, alternative route or repair programme matters through the services it actually enables and the time it buys. Its value also depends on access, affordability and exposure to the same disruption as the primary system. Institutions therefore need to distinguish functioning today from the ability to meet another shock tomorrow. For more exposed societies, the decisive constraint may be the ability to obtain supply rather than its existence somewhere in the global system.
The meaning of 9.6 is a further, limited deterioration within an already severe systemic condition. It does not imply inevitable collapse or the exhaustion of every buffer. The phase remains unchanged because disruption continues to transmit across essential systems while responses still operate. Durable safer passage, sustained affordability, successful repair and replenished reserves would strengthen the case for stabilisation. Renewed interruption of essential flows or demonstrable failure of present responses would weaken it. On the evidence reviewed for this assessment, functioning responses limit the increase but do not yet establish a durable reversal.
This public synthesis continues ERPI’s 10 September 2026 assessment and presents the 4 October assessment with independently checked public sources. The research cutoff is 4 October 2026, 15:45 Europe/Sofia. Reported observations, forecasts, announced measures and ERPI interpretation are distinguished throughout. The presentation derives from ERPI’s proprietary Global Disorder Index model; it neither discloses the internal methodology nor calculates the overall reading by averaging the public components.
© 2026 European Risk Policy Institute (ERPI). All rights reserved. Author: Ivan Savov. Prepared with Aya (IAAI) as AI-assisted research and drafting support under human editorial control.
